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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents an overview of the strategic and security issues surrounding the 
Straits of Malacca. It begins by introducing the strategic nature of the Straits of Malacca 
and piracy threat in the busy sea lane. Subsequently this paper discusses the issues and 
interests of the major powers in the Straits of Malacca historically. Furthermore this paper 
covers the contemporary Asia Pacific‟s powers such as United States, India, Japan and 
China. Then, the position of the three littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore 
towards the issue of piracy in the Straits of Malacca is touched upon before analysing the 
littoral states' position on external powers' involvement in the Straits of Malacca. This 
paper also briefly discusses the individual littoral states' interests in the vital sea lane.  
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INTRODUCTION: THE STRATEGIC NATURE OF THE STRAITS OF 
MALACCA 
  
The major sea lanes in Southeast Asia are comprised of a few key straits such as the 
Malacca and Singapore Straits, the Sunda Straits and the Lombok Straits. Of these 
regional chokepoints, the Straits of Malacca has been of profound significance. Indeed, 
this long and shallow channel has acted as both gateway and bottleneck, at least since the 
earliest recorded history.  It has been the scene of almost unending struggles for control 
among competing political and commercial interests, both local and distant, and yet has 
provided a lifeline that has brought prosperity and development to states and peoples 
dependent on imports or exports of goods exchanged with remotely located partners.
1
 At 
different times in its history, the Straits of Malacca has been controlled by the Dutch, 
Portuguese, and British, and has been used to link Africa and India to China, Japan, and 
Southeast Asia.
2
 Controlling the precious commodities of the region which had to pass 
the Straits was the prize. The spices of the Mollucas, the jungle products of the interior, 
the precious metals of the hinterlands were to bring explorers, traders, merchants, 
colonists and eventually, colonisation to the region.
3
 
 
 Today, the Straits of Malacca is the world‟s second busiest commercial shipping 
lane, surpassed only by the Dover Strait which runs between Britain and France.
4
 In 
essence, the Straits of Malacca derive their enduring importance from the simple factor of 
its strategic location. An appreciation of this factor can be gained from a glance at the 
geographic patterns of the straits particularly the arrangement of continental, peninsular 
and archipelagic land masses and the straits and seas around them.
5
  Unquestionably, the 
Straits of Malacca remains a key point on the shortest sea route from the ports of India 
and the Persian Gulf and from the entrepots of Europe via the Suez Canal-Red Sea route 
to port of mainland East Asia.
6
   
 
 For centuries, the Straits of Malacca, a narrow waterway has been a major conduit 
for long distance trade between Asia and the West. The Straits is 520 miles long, and 
provide the main corridor between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.  Because 
the Straits is relatively shallow, being only 21.8 metres deep at some points, the 
maximum draught recommended by the IMO for passing ships is 19.8 metres.  The 
navigable channel at its narrowest point is only 1.5 miles wide.
7
  This creates a natural 
bottleneck, with the potential for a collision, grounding or oil spill. The disruption of 
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shipping or any threat to close or restrict access through the Straits of Malacca would 
have a significant impact on world oil prices.  If necessary, shippers could avoid the 
Straits but only at some additional cost, time and disruption.
8
  In terms of total volume, in 
2008 for instance, at least 76,381 ships passed through the Straits of Malacca, ranging 
from Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) to fishing vessels.
9
  Moreover in terms of value, 
the total tonnages carried by ships through the Straits of Malacca every year amount to 
525 million metric tonnes worth a total of US$390 billion.
10
 Given the statistics, the 
waterway is extremely important to the international users as well as to the littoral states.  
The Straits of Malacca is the most used and the most well-known of the Southeast Asian 
waters. Huge tonnages of ships continue to pass through the Straits, drawing on both 
international markets and on local and regional feeder ports.
11
   
 
  The Straits of Malacca is shared between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and 
serves as a major international navigation route linking the Indian Ocean with the South 
China Sea.  Merchant ships from Japan and other East Asian states en route to South 
Asia, the Middle East or Europe also pass through the Straits of Malacca.  The Straits of 
Malacca is the shortest and preferred route for ships less than 250,000 tons dwt (dead 
weight tonnage) transiting the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea when compared to 
the next best alternatives, the Lombok, Makassar and Sunda Straits.
12
  On a global basis, 
some 72 percent of east-bound loaded tankers transit the Straits of Malacca. The 
availability of excellent bunker fuel, communication and repair facilities, particularly in 
Singapore and Malaysia makes it doubly attractive for ships to use the Straits of Malacca 
route.
13
  By using the Straits instead of the other alternative routes, super-large tankers 
ferrying crude oil from Middle East to the Far East can save up to 1,600 kilometre or 
roughly three days sailing time.
14
   
 
 According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), currently 11 
million barrels of oil per day (b/d) passes through the Straits of Malacca, but this would 
be increased as oil consumption in developing Asian nations rises by an estimated 
average of three percent per annum until 2025.  China alone will account for one-third of 
that increase, which will see demand growth doubling to nearly 30 million b/d in 2025 
from 14.5 million b/d in 2000.
15
  Moreover, according to the EIA, much of the additional 
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supply will be imported from the Middle East and Africa and most of this volume would 
need to pass through the strategic Straits of Malacca.
16
 
 
 The Straits of Malacca is among the most strategically important international 
waterways of the world.  It is a chokepoint in naval terms, the control of which is 
desirable for strategic mobility.
17
  It is also a very congested waterway with some 200 
ships plying the Straits daily.  For every ship that passes through however, there is a risk 
not only of an accident that might include crude oil, toxic chemicals or radioactive 
substances but also of a piracy attack.  The threat of an ecological disaster caused by such 
an attack cannot be ignored.  Any disruption to traffic or any increase in dangers to the 
crew of ship using the Straits particularly due to pirate attacks may force the vessels 
which pass through the Straits to use the longer safer route.  The fight against piracy is 
thus, part of the efforts to enhance the overall safety of passage through the vital Straits.  
 
 Traffic in the Straits of Malacca has rapidly augmented in the last few years as a 
result of increased crude shipments to China. The free and save navigation of commercial 
vessels in Southeast Asia is thus, essential for international trade.  The surge in piracy is 
one of the dark sides of globalisation.  The increase in international trade over the past 
decade means more opportunities for pirates to attack merchant ships.  Director of the 
Royal Malaysian Police said that "where there's sugar, the ants come".
18
  The Straits of 
Malacca is the world's second busiest commercial shipping lane and the lifeline of the 
economy of many countries that depend on the safe and timely shipment of oil and 
industrial goods to support economic growth.  However, maritime piracy continues to be 
a paramount threat in the Straits.  Therefore, the necessary efforts must be undertaken to 
tackle the issue either among the littoral states or between the littoral states and the user 
states.  
 
PIRACY THREAT IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA 
 
Piracy is a historical and cultural phenomenon that has continued in this modern age to 
affect maritime traffic in some of the world's busiest shipping lanes.  Many of the piracy 
incidents occur along the coasts of South Africa, Nigeria, Bangladesh, India, Ecuador, 
and in the Red Sea.  According to the report by the IMB-PRC, the number of piracy 
attacks on shipping throughout the world in 2006 was 239.  This represents a significant 
drop in the number of attacks from the previous year of 276.  The number of incidents of 
piracy increased in 2007 when 263 incidents were reported.  However, based on the 
report, there were only seven cases reported to have occurred in the Straits of Malacca.
19
  
According to the IMB-PRC, the piracy attacks are divided based on location for example 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Straits of Malacca.  The principle purpose of this 
is to increase awareness of the problem, impress upon the Governmental representatives 
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concerned the need for action and more importantly, motivate political will to act at 
national and regional level for preventing and suppressing piracy.
20
 According to the 
report provided by IMB, the nature of the attacks indicates that the pirates boarding the 
vessels are better armed and they have shown no hesitation in assaulting and injuring the 
crew.  However, the IMB does not provide the nature of attack by location.      
 
Most of the concerns regarding piracy in Southeast Asia have in recent years 
focused on the southern parts of the Straits of Malacca.  There appears to be two main 
reasons for this. First, it is clear that the Straits of Malacca is of major strategic 
importance as a bottleneck for international maritime trade. An attack blocking the 
Straits, would force vessels to take the detour around the west coast of Sumatra, 
something which would have large economic consequences not least for Europe, Japan 
and the US.
21
  Second, the threat of "petty piracy" which for the last two decade has been 
a relatively minor security concern for commercial vessels in the southern parts of the 
Straits seems to indicate a greater risk for terror attacks against transiting commercial 
vessels.
22
  The assumption seems to be that the pirates who frequently attack commercial 
vessels for the purpose of robbing them might get the idea of perpetrating a terrorist 
attack.      
 
 Piracy in the Straits of Malacca has already led to a high economic cost reflected 
by the loss of merchandise and ships and the increased insurance premiums added to a 
number of cargoes that pass through the Straits.  Moreover, an accident caused by a 
piracy incident or a terrorist attack on an oil supertanker crossing the Straits could cause 
an environmental disaster of massive proportions.
23
      
 
MAJOR POWERS INVOLVEMENT IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA   
 
The strategic nature of the Straits of Malacca as the main sea lane of communication to 
East Asia has led many countries wanting to control the Straits including the US, China, 
Japan and India.  Furthermore, the major regional sea powers are competing for Asian 
maritime dominance.  The US as a global sea power, sees India and Japan as key partners 
in balancing the rise of China and it also busy fostering international maritime 
cooperation to build what two senior US Naval officers have referred to as "The 1000-
Ship Global Maritime Network" top counter terrorism.
24
 Indeed, the pursuance of 
strategies to gain control has made the Straits of Malacca a venue of a silent struggle 
between rising powers. Because the Straits of Malacca is so important to the 
transportation of oil and raw material, the free and safe navigation of commercial vessels 
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in the sea lane becomes an important issue to the littoral states as well as the user states. 
There are many countries strongly desire to have full control on the Straits of Malacca or 
at least possess a „commanding power‟ on the Straits due to various reasons.25  
Furthermore they have strongly shown their yearning on the Straits. 
 
United States 
 
The Straits of Malacca is considered as one of the world's most important maritime 
chokepoints.  Hence, it has become a centrepiece in the battle to establish a new ocean 
regime that finally culminated in the 1982 UNCLOS.
26
  In 1971, there was a meeting 
among the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore on the security of the 
Straits of Malacca.
27
  The meeting resulted in a full agreement between Indonesia and 
Malaysia and a partial agreement between these two countries. The government of 
Indonesia and Malaysia declared jointly that the Straits of Malacca was not an 
international waterway, although they fully recognised its use for international shipping. 
Singapore however, expressed reservation but took note of the position of the other two 
countries.  On the basis talks, it was declared on November 19, 1971, that the safety of 
navigation through the Straits of Malacca was the responsibility of the three littoral states 
and required the cooperation of all three nations.  It was also stated that safety of 
navigation and internationalization of the Straits would be considered as two separate 
issues.
28
  The US nonetheless did not take an official position on the issue when it first 
emerged, although in 1971 States Department officials raised the issue with the 
Indonesian and Malaysian governments. 
 
   There was a divergence of view between the State and Defence Departments; 
Defence was concerned with the implications for American strategic interests, while 
Senate viewed the issue within the wider frame of US relations with the non-communist 
Southeast Asian nations.  The Department of Defence favoured a hard line.  This position 
was expressed in Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird's subsequently rejected proposal that 
Japan establish a naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
29
  In addition, Admiral Moorer, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that "…the US feels we should have and 
must have freedom to go through, under, and over the Straits of Malacca."  This hard line 
was adopted because of the strategic importance of the Straits to the defence policy of the 
US, which was proven during the 1971 Bangladesh Crisis.
30
   
 
 However, by 1974, when the Law of the Sea Conference was convened, the Straits 
of Malacca issue had become part of the general US position on the Law of the Sea.  The 
US position on transit through international straits was best summed up by Secretary of 
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State Kissinger on April 8, 1976, "…this guaranteed unimpeded transit is a principle to 
which the US attaches the utmost importance."  In the same speech he mentioned 
specifically that the Straits of Malacca as an example of straits through which free transit 
is vital to US interests, which depends on strategic mobility.
31
  The US realised the 
importance of the Straits of Malacca and therefore it will ensure that the freedom of 
navigation in the Straits would remain uninterrupted.      
 
 The stability of the ASEAN as an economic region is a matter of national interest 
affecting the well-being of all Americans.  Its economic prospects, the promotion of 
democratic values and human rights, and its traditional security interests all require 
sustained engagement by the US in the region.  Therefore, maintaining a credible security 
presence is an important element in its effort to build a sense of an Asia Pacific 
community vital to the post Cold War international system now taking shape.
32
  
 
 For security purposes, the US has seen Southeast Asia as a maritime region of vast 
sea spaces.  Washington has identified one of its major security responsibilities, therefore, 
to be maintaining open sea lanes for international commerce.
33
  As a maritime nation, the 
US national security depends on a stable legal regime assuring freedom of navigation on 
and overflight of international waters.  SLOCs connect world countries with one another.  
In peace time, these ocean routes serve as commercial trade routes but in war-time, SLOC 
translates itself as the strategic path varying in course and distance depending on the 
geography of the landmass, reefs and shallows as also the locations of ports and harbours.  
Hence to the military, SLOCs are the instrument of maritime power with geography being 
the determinator for the forces being deployed to support friends or deter adversaries.  
SLOC is the route taken by a ship to transit from A to B.  In maritime and economy, it 
should be the shortest distance, economical and timely delivery of cargo.  SLOC is the 
artery of region and serves as an umbilical cord for the country's economy.   
 
 Strategically tanker cargo from Southeast Asian countries carries mainly crude oil 
imported from Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia to the refineries located in Singapore and 
elsewhere in the region.  Increasingly, more of the locally produced crudes are refined 
within the region.  Both Indonesia and Malaysia send crudes to the Singapore refineries 
under processing deals for refining before bringing back the needed products. The 
region's low sulphur crudes are sold largely to Japan and the US. Refined products mainly 
from Singapore are shipped to destinations within the region and further afield in small 
tanker of one to several thousand dwt, while larger shipments to Hong Kong, Japan and 
elsewhere are carried in tankers of up to about 100,000 dwt.
34
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 The pattern of shipping movements in the region hinges on the trunk route from 
Europe via the Straits of Malacca through Singapore, thence branching out through Hong 
Kong northwards to East Asia and westwards to the West coast of the ., and through 
Singapore southwards to the Australian ports.  Feeder services are established to link 
more than one hundreds ports open to foreign trade, of which some 25 port serve nearly 
all the intra-regional traffic.  The regional feeder services channel cargo from within the 
region to Singapore and Hong Kong to be transhipped to larger vessels serving the trunk 
routes.  Inward cargo is received at Singapore and Hong Kong where it is then distributed 
to the local ports.
35
  Given this scenario, it shows the importance of the Straits of Malacca 
not only to the littoral states but also to the user states. Therefore, many countries yearn to 
have control on the Straits of Malacca and the US is trying to achieve its objective.  
 
 The unique historical place of Southeast Asia in the American experience only 
adds another layer to its already considerable importance to Washington: as an economic 
and political partner, and as a place of great geo-strategic consequence sitting astride 
some of the world‟s most critical sea lanes, the Straits of Malacca, through which nearly 
half the world‟s trade passes. A politically stable, territorially secure, and prosperous 
Southeast Asia is critical to the US interests in the Asia Pacific region and it can best be 
achieved through the US involvement in an effective ASEAN.
36
 
 
 The formulation of the US naval strategy in the Southeast Asia particularly in the 
Straits of Malacca has largely been determined by the economic and security interests.  
An uninterrupted access to the oil and mineral resources of the region has acquired 
strategic significance because of their effects on the economic stability of the US.  
Therefore any substantial military and political change in the region which could 
adversely affect the flow of oil would greatly influence global economic and security 
issues.  In the past, the US military presence has served as a symbol of continued Western 
interests in the stability of the Southeast Asia region.  In order to remain an important 
political and military force the US has secured a pre-eminent position in the region 
through an elaborate network of communication stations, port facilities and in particular 
by developing a supply base.   
 
 From the moment of its birth as an independent nation, the US was heavily 
engaged in overseas trade.  In the 1970s the US merchant marine was the second largest 
in the world.  Even though the young nation's boundaries did not yet extend to the Pacific, 
in that decade as many as 30 merchant vessels per year visited Chinese port.
37
  The US 
interests in the Asia Pacific and specifically in the Straits of Malacca are related to its 
national security.  It further declares itself as a Pacific nation with the justification that its 
national territory is partly located in the region.  Hawaii is physically separated from the 
continental US by thousands of miles.  The headquarters in Hawaii is closer to Tokyo, 
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Sydney, or Beijing than it is to Washington.   Nevertheless it feels responsible for security 
in the Asia Pacific region because of its military base in Hawaii.  Hawaii is the ultimate 
US fallback point as well as the communication hub and major supply depot for the 
whole Asia Pacific region.  Therefore one of the US security focuses in Asia Pacific is the 
Straits of Malacca as the strategic route to the Hawaii.  This context suggests that the US 
is a Pacific power that has interests in Asia.         
 
 The USPACOM was established as a unified command on 1 January 1947 and it 
is the oldest and largest of the US unified commands.
38
  Of the 43 countries and entities in 
the PACOM area of responsibility, five are the US treaty allies.
39
  The USPACOM based 
in Hawaii has an area of responsibility that covers approximately 50 percent of the earth 
surface and some 60 percent of its population, including the world's two most populous 
countries and the world's most populous nation, China.
40
 The USPACOM's area of 
responsibility spans an area from Alaska to Madagascar and from India to the South 
Pacific. As of March 2008, the USPACOM total force consisted of some 300,000 military 
personal from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines which is about twenty percent of 
all active-duty US military forces.  This force consists of service components, subordinate 
Unified Commands and Standing Joint Task Force.   The service components are 
including US Pacific Fleet.
41
   
 
 The US Pacific Fleet, headquartered at Makalapa Creter near Pearl Harbour, is the 
world's largest naval command.  The Commander, US Pacific Fleet supports several 
unified commanders including the USPACOM.  With its forward-deployed presence, the 
US Pacific Fleet protects vital US interests in the Asia Pacific region.
42
  The USPACOM 
is its largest geographical unified command and is responsible for the US military 
presence, strategy and policy execution in Southeast Asia.
43
  The US also sends warships, 
including aircraft carriers from its Pacific Fleet through the Straits of Malacca to reinforce 
its military presence in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf which the source of the most of 
the world's exportable oil and a major source of the oil that the US itself imports.  This 
naval surge capacity through the Straits is especially important to Washington at times of 
crisis in the Gulf or Indian Ocean region.      
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 From the strategic point of view, it was absolutely essential that the US should 
have unimpeded transit rights as part of the swing strategy under which US naval forces 
located in the Asia Pacific would be automatically shifted to the Atlantic in case of a 
general East-West war.  Dependence on the Straits would be of even more consequence if 
the Panama Canal were to be closed for some reason such as domestic instability in 
Panama and the only feasible short route from the Pacific to the Atlantic was through the 
Straits of Malacca.
44
 The Straits of Malacca retain major value and importance within the 
Pacific because the emphasis is shifting from North Asia westwards to the sea lanes 
extending from the Persian Gulf to Japan.  Most of the US Seventh Fleet is based east of 
the Straits, in Guam, Japan, and the Philippines, and the Third Fleet is based on the US 
West Coast, therefore, rapid deployment of units to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf 
means transit through the Straits.
45
  
 
 Secretary of the Navy Edward Hidalgo admitted in 1980 that the US is covering 
three oceans with the resources of one and a half, so it need high strategic mobility that 
will allow for a fast transfer and redeployment of naval units to spots of upheaval.
46
  This 
requirement was underlined by the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and the immediate need 
to transfer naval forces to deter both sides from involving other Gulf states or blocking 
the Hormuz Strait. The airspace over the Straits of Malacca is within territorial waters and 
under the jurisdiction of the littoral states. The situation might affect any airlift of men or 
equipment from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean.   
 
 The Straits of Malacca is essential for the "island perimeter" adopted after the 
Vietnam War, which is based primarily on naval and air power, and depends on strategic 
mobility and flexibility of deployment.  This island perimeter extends from Masirah off 
Oman to Diego Garcia east through Australia, and north to the Marianas and Japan.
47
  
This approach places a premium on the US strategic mobility.  As the number of the US 
land bases in Asia and the Pacific becomes smaller and renewal of lease over the 
remaining bases less certain, shorter sea routes become more important for the effective 
projection of naval power in the region.
48
  US strategists were worried about the fact that 
the Soviet Navy gained access to Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, and Haiphong in Vietnam 
and to Kompong Som in Kampuchea.  Such bases considerably improve Soviet bombers.   
 
 On the other hand, the west base that could effectively control the western 
approaches to the Straits, while the eastern ones are already covered by Subic Bay and 
Clark in the Philippines.  Free navigation of warships and submarines through and under 
the straits and sea lanes of Southeast Asia is crucial to the nuclear strategy of the US and 
is thus a matter of the US national security interests.  To attack or defend against a 
nuclear submarine, its location must be known.  Four of the 16 strategic straits in the 
world which are important to the mobility of the US submarine fleet in reaching target 
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areas are in Southeast Asia namely the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, Sunda and Ombai-
Wetar.
49
  Given the strategic values of the Straits of Malacca to the US since the Cold 
War, thus it is crucial to maintain its interests in the vital Straits.  Therefore this context 
suggests that the US proposal to patrol the Straits of Malacca clearly due to the strategic 
interests of the Straits of Malacca, yet piracy as a means to justify its initiative to patrol 
the vital Straits.           
 
 In 1970s the issue of transit passage through the Straits of Malacca become 
critical after Indonesia and Malaysia bilateral treaty demarcating their territorial sea 
boundary.  The major users of the Straits challenged the Malaysian-Indonesian claims. 
They argued that under customary international law, the Straits of Malacca was a strait 
used for international navigation.
50
  Free of navigation was to the advantage of maritime 
powers.  The reason was they wanted unimpeded access through straits traditionally used 
for international navigation so that they could deploy naval forces as quickly and as 
expeditiously as possible from one theatre of operation to another.  In this context, the 
Straits of Malacca was important in the US "swing strategy" of the 1970s that involved 
moving naval carrier groups between the Pacific and Indian Ocean and the Middle East.
51
  
It was noted at that time that naval mobility was a key plank of the US maritime security 
interests, of which free transit through international straits constituted the legal 
foundation.  
 
 The US has vital military and alliance interests in the Straits of Malacca.  
Relatively very few of the US oil imports come through the Straits.  But as much as 80 
percent of the oil used by its Northeast Asian allies, Japan and South Korea, is carried by 
tankers that traverse Southeast Asia.  The US prosperity in turn relies on the economic 
health of its trade partners.  Therefore, it is crucial to the US to ensure the security of 
shipping and safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca.  To preserve its alliances, the 
US further must protect the oil lifelines of these allies.  Most of their oil passes along the 
Straits of Malacca but the biggest laden tankers go through Indonesia, via Sunda, Lombok 
or Makassar Straits.  
 
 The security, prosperity and vital interests of the US in the Straits of Malacca 
obviously are increasingly coupled to those of other nations.  It has been identified that 
the closure of the Straits of Malacca would be precarious to the US interests and also 
destabilises the Asia Pacific region as a whole.
52
  With at least half of Pacific seaborne 
trade and much of its military traffic utilizing the Straits, instability in Singapore, 
Indonesia and Malaysia could be very damaging for the Straits area.  Closing of the 
Straits could be provoked or aided by terrorist activities aimed at disrupting shipping.         
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 Therefore, the role of the US in Asia particularly is driven by its strategic interests 
to secure the merchant ships and oil tankers that belong to the US's allies.  Japan and 
South Korea use the Straits of Malacca extensively to export its finished products and to 
import oil from the Middle East.  The US has to guarantee its allies that it can protect 
their economic interests.  Failing to do so, Japan and South Korea might seriously 
consider securing their merchant ships and oil tankers unilaterally by dispatching their 
own navies and self defence force.  If this happen, China also would feel threaten and the 
power struggle in the Straits will become furious.  As most of these Asian countries are 
the US trading partners, therefore the US would be economically affected if the economic 
growth of those countries had disrupted. The US-Japan relationship remains the critical 
linchpin of the US Asian security strategy.  Japan anchors the US strategic position in the 
region, the US is Japan's largest trade partner, and the two countries together account for 
over 30 percent of global trade.
53
  Since 2001, Japan has developed a more aggressive 
foreign policy and forward defence posture, including bolstering its military alliance with 
the US High level Japan-US bilateral initiatives declared an expanded commitment to 
security cooperation by establishing common strategic objective.  
 
 The economic importance of the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf to Japan, South 
Korea and China, which run through the heart of Southeast Asia, simply cannot be 
overstated.  More than US$1.3 trillion in merchandise trade passed through the Straits of 
Malacca and Lombok in 1999.  The economies of Japan and South Korea, indeed of the 
bulk of East Asia, depend on the Persian and Gulf for upwards of 75 percent of their oil 
and gas supplies.  As a result, any disruption or dislocation of energy supplies would have 
an impact on the economies of East Asia and would have significant secondary effects on 
the US economy as well.
54
 Moreover, 38 percent of US trade is within the region, 
amounting to more than US$1.1 trillion in 2006.  In contrast, 14 percent of US trade is 
with the European Union, 18 percent is with Canada, and 19 percent is with Latin 
America.
55
   
 
 The US has several key strategic relationships in Asia in addition to the formal 
alliance, Japan and South Korea.  Singapore, India and Taiwan are among the US key 
strategic relationships in the region.
56
  Hence, a stable Asia Pacific region is critical for 
the US interests in the region.  India is emerging as a potentially as the US important 
strategic partner in South Asia and beyond.  India is viewed as an increasingly valuable 
partner that could act as a counterweight to rising Chinese influence. Singapore 
meanwhile has been a close partner for some time and in has formalized its strategic and 
defense relationship with the US.  The island country is important to the US particularly 
to support for port visits, ship repairs, training areas and opportunities. These are 
important for both daily US presence in the region and for rapid and flexible crisis 
response.  In particular, Washington wants to maintain close political ties with Singapore 
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as a strong supporter of the US strategic objectives in the region.  Singapore is a key 
logistical hub positioned strategically between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.  
It is also strategically significant because Singapore is the only non-US base port capable 
of docking an US aircraft carrier in the region.
57
   
 
 Terrorism in the Asia Pacific region remains a serious threat to the US national 
security interests including the welfare and security of its citizens in the region and the 
security of its regional friends and allies.  Since 9/11, piracy has also been linked to the 
threat of maritime terrorist attacks.
58
  Terrorism moreover is recognised as a threat to the 
US foreign and domestic security.
59
  It threatens the positive regional trends toward 
stability, democratization, and prosperity.  The US strongly support funding to train and 
equip counter-terrorism units in Indonesia and the Philippines, to provide counter-
terrorism training for Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and to support 
regional counter terrorism training, including at the new Southeast Asia Regional Centre 
for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia.
60
  The greatest risks to maritime security 
stem from „nightmare scenarios‟ such as a WMD placed in a container on a vessel, or the 
hijacking of a ship carrying dangerous cargo either of which could be primed to detonate 
in a crowded port or city.  Tracking these threats especially those presented by Al Qaeda 
requires global intelligence and cooperation.  This context suggests that the piracy clearly 
is used to legitimise the US initiative to patrol the Straits of Malacca.  
 
 According to Evans J. R. Revere, Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
the Pacific, the US can anticipate funding needs for counter-terrorism operations 
elsewhere in the region.  One of these is maritime security in Southeast Asia, particularly 
in the Straits of Malacca, through which 30 percent of total shipping and 50 percent of oil 
and gas shipments pass.
61
  The US has exercised strong leadership in shaping conceptual, 
legal and diplomatic improvements.  It seeks to build greater regional capabilities and 
new forms of cooperation to address the vulnerability of maritime shipping in Southeast 
Asia, where an attack on the Straits of Malacca or other key sea lanes could have an 
enormous impact on the regional and indeed, the global economy. 
 
 Al Qaeda has targeted and continues to target oil infrastructure as a way of 
“bleeding” the US economy.  Along the oil supply and distribution chain, numerous 
chokepoints are vulnerable to attack.  The Straits of Malacca has been identified as of the 
vital Straits to the US.  In addition, according to the Institute for the Analysis of Global 
Security (IAGS), 60 percent of the world's oil is transported by the sea via 3,500 tankers 
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annually.  Everyday 26 million barrels of oil flow through the two chokepoints, the Straits 
of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Malacca in Asia.
62
  
 
 Piracy has not received much public attention in the US. Pirate attacks on US 
ships in the Straits of Malacca have been few, partly no doubt because the US commercial 
vessels that pass through the Straits are comparatively not many.  Furthermore, neither 
the public nor the media in the US has paid much attention to piracy.
63
  Given this 
situation, it is true that the piracy issue as a means to preserve its strategic interests in the 
international waterway, therefore the US justifies its intention to be involved in the Straits 
of Malacca based on piracy threat which has been linked to terrorism.     
  
Japan 
  
As a major user state, Japan maintained a special interest in the Straits of Malacca 
essentially for commercial reasons. Japan's prime concern has been the safe and 
uninterrupted passage of the large number of huge oil tankers that carry the country's 
major energy supply from the Persian Gulf.  The vulnerability of that oil lifeline has been 
responsible not only for Japan's willingness to finance hydrographic surveys of the Straits 
in order to improve safety of navigation but also for Tokyo's ill-considered, aborted 
attempt during 1971, to impose an internationally controlled regime.
64
  If a potentially 
hostile power were to gain control of the maritime approaches to Southeast Asia, Japan's 
economic health would be fundamentally threatened.  As long as the US remains the 
dominant world power, and has a strong alliance with Japan, this will not occur.
65
  The 
Japanese policy, however, has been ambivalent because it has attempted to divorce 
military from commercial considerations.  Therefore, it is important to take note that the 
two most important variables defining Japan's future sea lane security are the continued 
forward presence of the US Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific and China's future 
political orientation and maritime strategy.
66
   
   
 Japan's desire to send its military forces to assist in the security of the Straits of 
Malacca is due to its own interests.  Almost 80 percent of Japan's oil import trade traffic 
from the Middle East travels through the Straits of Malacca, giving that major global 
power enormous vested interest in a range of maritime issues in the region.  Equally, as 
the economic power of Southeast Asia grows, passage through the Straits has assumed 
even greater importance. A combination of archipelagic geography, poor resources 
                                                 
 
62
 A. Bordetsky, R. Hwang, A. Korin, D. Lovaas & L. Tonachel, Securing America solving our oil 
dependence through innovation, National Resources Defense Council, New York, 2005, p. 11. 
 
63
 W.M. Carpenter & D.G. Wiencek, Maritime piracy in Asia, in, W.M. Carpenter & D.G. 
Wiencek (eds.), Asian security handbook an assessment of political-security issues in the Asia Pacific 
region, p. 85.  
 
64
 S. Bateman, Regional response to enhance maritime security in East Asia, the Korean Journal of 
Defense Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2006, p. 30.  
 
65
 P. Dibb, Indonesia: the key to Southeast Asia's security, International Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 4, p. 
833. 
 
66
 E. Graham, Japan's sea lane security, 1940-2004: a matter of life and death?, Routledge, New 
York, 2006, p. 2.  
 15 
allocation and the large distances separating Japan from its primary suppliers of energy, 
raw materials and food has accentuated the importance of shipping to its security.
67
  Japan 
depends particularly on sea lanes connecting it with the oil terminals in the Gulf, from 
which it draws nearly all its oil, and other shipping routes connecting it with the mineral 
resources of the Indian Ocean basin, Southeast Asia and North America. Japan's economy 
highly depends on safe passage of ships through the Straits of Malacca, and therefore, 
Japan has long cooperated with Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia in the area of 
navigation safety and seabed mapping through joint research, sharing of equipment and 
training.   
 
 The Straits of Malacca is important to ship Japanese manufactured goods to 
Europe, Australia, the Middle East and Africa.  It is, therefore, in Japan's interests to 
ensure the security of the Straits of Malacca.
68
  In addition, Japan is one of the biggest 
supporters of both regional and multilateral efforts to combat piracy. It has sponsored 
anti-piracy drills and joint exercises with littoral states, and as the US closest ally in the 
Asia Pacific region, Japan has cooperated with the US under the RMSI and PSI.
69
 The 
Japan-US alliance is the most significant pillar of Japan‟s security strategy ever since the 
end of World War II.  The alliance initially served the purpose of ensuring the security of 
Japan.  Both countries have overriding common interests stretching from economic 
interdependence to political coordination and strategic alignment.
70
 Therefore, Japan 
supports the initiatives proposed by the US to tackle piracy threat in the Straits of 
Malacca and also in US war on terror.  
 
 The increase in piracy incidents in the Straits since the 1997/1998 Asian economic 
crisis resulted in an increase of Japanese assistance in anti-piracy efforts.  Japan has also 
aided civilian law enforcement capabilities of the littoral states through its Coast Guard.  
In addition, Japanese Coast Guard vessels have carried out joint exercise with civilian 
maritime counterparts in Southeast Asia.  Japan's approach emphasises the sovereignty of 
the littoral states and focuses in their cooperative capacity building. The Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) funds the Coast Guard‟s seminars to train 
maritime authorities in Southeast Asia, and Japan‟s aid is critical in helping to create 
maritime patrol authority where local capacity is lacking particularly in Indonesia.
71
 
  
 At the 1999 ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit, the late Japan's Prime Minister 
Keizo Obuchi first suggested the creation of a regional coastguard as an anti-piracy 
measure.
72
  It was proposed that these patrols be based on a multilateral approach and 
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involve Japan, South Korea, China and the three littoral states.  The two littoral states of 
Malaysia and Indonesia, nonetheless, strongly oppose the internationalization of the 
Straits of Malacca.  The littoral states welcomed Japan's help in forms other than military 
forces. Furthermore, China openly opposed Japan's proposal, which was perceived in 
Beijing as an effort to reduce its rising maritime influence in Southeast Asia.  For a long 
time, Japan has wanted to mobilize its forces to help in the patrols, but this has always 
been refused.   
 
 Bilateral cooperation has also steadily advanced.  For example, in November 
2000, a patrol vessel of the Japan Coast Guard visited India and Malaysia for combined 
exercises aimed at combating piracy.
73
  Meanwhile, it is not an easy task to develop a 
framework of regional efforts, because the problem is directly concerned with national 
sovereignty.  In February 2001, Japan announced that it is considering deploying vessels 
to patrol the Straits of Malacca as an effort to combat piracy.
74
  Tokyo's proposal to join 
forces from Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and China to patrol the 
waterways comes during a growing debate over the possible revision of Article 9 of the 
Japanese constitution.
75
 This reflects a change in the Japanese thinking regarding 
maritime security. Tokyo realises that Japan is indeed a major maritime power with 
strategic interests. Moreover, Japan has come under growing pressure from the US to 
assume a greater security profile for a more dynamic and active role in its national 
interests.  Although Japan continues to propose multilateral joint patrols, Southeast Asian 
nations, particularly the littoral states of Malaysia and Singapore have so far not accepted 
the proposal.
76
         
 
 In November 2004, Japan led a multilateral initiative to establish an information-
sharing centre in Singapore. This initiative involved 16 Asian countries in the effort. 
Furthermore, Japan has taken unilateral steps to devote ten naval ships to monitoring the 
high seas around the Straits of Malacca. Japan also announced its plans to present three 
new, high speed patrol boats worth US$10.5 million each to the Indonesian government 
as part of Japan‟s overseas development assistance in 2005.77  Japan‟s anti-piracy efforts 
have also promoted multilateral institution building in the region.  Japan for instance has 
financed efforts of the IMO to track and study piracy incidents.  Japan‟s Ship and Ocean 
Foundation has also provided seed money for the IMO sanctioned Anti-Piracy Centre in 
Kuala Lumpur. In March 2005, Japan held the second “ASEAN-Japan Seminar on 
Maritime Security and Combating Piracy” in Tokyo to review progress of the ASEAN 
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countries on implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code.
78
   
 
 Indeed, following the abduction of Japanese crew of tugboat in the Straits of 
Malacca in March 2005, Japan offered to provide Indonesia with high speed patrol boats 
for anti-piracy missions in the vital sea lane.  Japan also proposed in 2005, multinational 
patrols in both territorial and international waters as a counter piracy measure.  This was 
received with scepticism by the littoral states particularly Indonesia and Malaysia, 
concerned over the violation of their sovereignty and limitations on controlling their 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), the littoral states were unwilling to allow Japanese 
forces to patrol their waters. Despite the strategic significance of the Straits of Malacca, 
Japan has so far focused on civilian cooperation and refrained from directly utilizing its 
maritime self-defence forces for specific tasks in the region other than disaster relief.  
Given that Japan occupied this region during World War II, activities by Japanese 
military forces in this area is a sensitive issue.  However, Japan has a huge stake in the 
security of the Straits of Malacca, given that it is its oil and economic lifeline. Therefore, 
any prolonged disruption or instability would imperil Japanese economic interests.  
Strategically and economically, instability as a result of increased radical challenges to 
the governments of the region would also be inimical to Japan interests.  Notoriously, 
Japan lacks its own sources of raw materials, oil most conspicuously, which need to be 
shipped through the vital chokepoint.   
 
India 
 
Another major power that has strong strategic interests in the Straits of Malacca is India.  
Over 50 percent of India's trade passes through the Malacca Strait, making security of this 
waterway, particularly in the context of piracy there and the lurking threat of maritime 
terrorism, a crucial security concern for India.
79
  Inclusion in its security would therefore 
be in India‟s national interest.  The mercantile traffic transiting the Straits of Malacca 
passes close to the Indian area of maritime interest and therefore, any unforeseen 
contingency or development in the Straits of Malacca has security implications for 
India.
80
   
 
India argues that it has a stake in maintaining the safety and security of the Straits 
of Malacca and that the government should pursue an aggressive strategy of contributing 
to the region‟s efforts to keep the Straits of Malacca safe and free from threat.81  While 
the littoral states are continuing their own initiatives to take care of this strategic 
waterway, India, which has a stake in the Straits, believes that it has a role to play in the 
Straits‟ security system.  And for India, the joint patrolling of the Straits of Malacca is 
evidence and endorsement of its claim that its security interests stretch up to and include 
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the Straits.
82
  India has developed capabilities in various aspects of maritime security and 
would be most willing to share its expertise with the countries of the region.   
 
 India also has become increasingly involved in Southeast Asian maritime security, 
as part of its reinvigorated activism in the wider Asia Pacific region and its “Look East” 
policy, aimed at strengthening its influence in Southeast Asia specifically.
83
  Indian naval 
strategy in the new century demands more submarines, a strong mine clearing capability 
and naval air reconnaissance capabilities to the Straits of Malacca.  India is following an 
important strategic maritime goal in a period of interdependence between world‟s geo-
economic regions and establishing an overall maritime presence in its sea area of strategic 
interest.  This strategic includes India‟s desire to project their prowess beyond their 
interest.
84
  Therefore, India is working towards building a navy that can take multiple sea 
challenges to the mainland.  India also underlines its claim as a leading maritime power 
through strong forward presence in each of its major island territories. 
 
 It is India's national interest to ensure that the Straits of Malacca remains a crime 
free sea lane.  Its closure could generate a massive increase in freight rates worldwide and 
hit bulk shipments hardest.  Ensuring that the Straits of Malacca do not fall into hostile 
hands that might choke the free flow of maritime vessels is a nightmare that many 
countries are anxious to prevent from being turned into reality.
85
  The proposed India-US 
joint patrolling of the sea lanes along the Straits of Malacca represents not only a new 
high in cooperation between the two countries, but also signals India's emergence as a key 
player in the region.
86
 Moreover, there has been a remarkable change in India-US 
relations in recent years.  For example, in 2002 the Indian and US navies worked together 
to ensure the safe transit of high-value units through the Straits of Malacca.
87
  
 
 India has a vital interest in seeing the Straits of Malacca remain in friendly hands.  
Its policy has led to an increasing engagement with Southeast Asia and the sea lanes to 
India's east are growing in significance for its energy security as New Delhi is looking for 
oil and gas supplies from Myanmar, Vietnam and Indonesia.  Thus, in 1999 India 
announced that its strategic interests are extended all the way from the Persian Gulf to the 
Straits of Malacca.  More importantly India has a critical interest in seeing the Straits of 
Malacca as one of the world's critical maritime superhighways not controlled by countries 
that are hostile to it.  India‟s seriousness in securing its strategic sea lane is evidenced in 
2001 when India deployed its navy to East Asia, from Singapore to Japan. 
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China 
  
China, a rising great power in the East Asian region, is also heavily dependant on the 
Straits of Malacca for trade and energy transportation.  China‟s strategic significance of 
this Straits increases every year. At present, approximately 60 percent of China‟s crude 
oil imports originate in the Middle East, and this figure is expected to rise to 75 percent 
by 2015.
88
  Oil from the Persian Gulf and Africa is shipped to China via the Straits of 
Malacca, Lombok or Makassar Straits.  Over the past few years Chinese leaders have 
come to view the straits, especially the Straits of Malacca, as a strategic vulnerability.  In 
November 2003, China declared that certain major powers were bent on controlling the 
Straits, and called for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate the perceived 
vulnerability.
89
   
 
 China Youth Daily, one Chinese leading newspaper quoted saying that “…it is no 
exaggeration to say that whoever controls the Straits of Malacca will also have a 
stranglehold on the energy route of China”.90  China‟s overwhelming reliance on the 
Straits of Malacca for energy transportation has made the Straits one of China‟s critical 
SLOCs that it must secure, especially from hostile foreign naval forces.  One of the ways 
China tries to seek SLOC security in the Straits of Malacca is through diplomacy.  Beijing 
is active in fostering relationships with the littoral states of the Straits of Malacca, 
especially Malaysia.  As President Hu Jintao of China highlighted, the Straits of Malacca 
dilemma is the key to China's energy security and any vulnerability will be a threat to 
China.
91
  Moreover, Zhao Nianyu of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies points 
out that the US could blockade the Straits of Malacca as of the three major challenges to 
China's Energy Strategy.
92
 He further points to the RMSI as a first step by the US military 
to garrison the Straits under the guise of counter-terrorist measures.      
 
 The Straits of Malacca dominates more than the commercial and economic life 
lines into and out of the rapidly expanding economies of East Asia, particularly China.  
The global strategic growth and expansion of aspiring powers can be contained and 
regulated through the mere control over the movement of their naval forces through the 
Straits of Malacca.  For Beijing, this reality is increasingly a vital interest.  Any Chinese 
naval and military surge into the Indian Ocean must pass through the Straits of Malacca.
93
 
If China is able to control the Straits of Malacca, it would reduce the possibility of the US 
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hegemony in the region since the Straits has become a vital international waterway for 
both commercial and strategic mobility. 
  
 The emergence of China as major global player will not only transform the 
regional geopolitical landscape but will also mean an increased dependence on the sea as 
an avenue for trade and transportation of energy and raw materials.  Within the region, 
the Straits of Malacca is one of the main sea lanes through which trade, energy, and raw 
material resources flow.  The rise of the regional power will increase the dependence on 
the regional sea lanes. This is because countries in the region depend on the sea as an 
avenue for trade and transportation of energy and raw materials.  In particular, the sea 
lane is vital to the transportation of goods, energy and raw materials to the dynamic 
economies of Northeast Asia includes China which is evidenced by the volume and value 
of resources trade that flows through the sea lanes.  China depends on the Straits to carry 
90 percent of its trade through the waterways, and more than 80 percent of its energy 
imports.
94
 Therefore, the country has a vital stake in keeping the Straits secure and safe.   
 
 For China, its concern on the security of oil supply prompts their defence 
apparatus to project their naval power in the Straits of Malacca and further to the Persian 
Gulf.
95
  In addition, China has no strategic oil reserve. It therefore realises that without 
the reserve, the country's economy is vulnerable. As such, China is serious in keeping the 
vital Straits open and securing the ships that are navigating through the chokepoints 
carrying crude oil from the Middle East.  It is vital for China to hold a strong position in 
the Straits of Malacca.  As the Straits of Malacca is the main entrance to East Asia from 
the West, China could protect its seaborne trade and oil supply within Southeast Asian 
countries. Offensive military option is to deploy rapid reaction forces when a crisis occurs 
while defensive posture is by creating credible deterrence capability.
96
 The strategy will 
show China‟s determination and strength to safeguard the country‟s interests. Hence, the 
security of the transport corridors is a big concern to China particularly in the Straits of 
Malacca.  
 
THE LITTORAL STATES OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA  
 
Southeast Asia has several SLOCs including the Straits of Malacca, the Singapore Straits 
and Sunda Straits.  The Straits of Malacca is of particular importance. It is viewed by 
many countries as a key feature in the development of commerce and security in the East-
West linkage.
97
  Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the security of the 
Straits of Malacca is almost indispensable for the growth of the Asian economies.  Due to 
the strategic environment in the Straits of Malacca, the stakes are particularly high for 
two groups of states. Firstly, the three littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore 
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and secondly, the user states, especially Japan, China and South Korea, which are 
dependent on the Straits of Malacca for the uninterrupted and efficient transit of cargo, 
especially energy supplies. Of course the US as the most powerful maritime power in the 
world is included in the list because it is a global power.  The US has also been indicated 
that it would remain the largest economy in the world. 
 
The Littoral State of Malaysia 
 
The Straits of Malacca is seen as a critical economic artery by Malaysia.  Malaysia 
depends on the Straits for resources, defence, shipping services, ports, tourism, and for 
facilitating external trade.
98
 The Straits run parallel to the industrial heartland of Malaysia 
serving the so called Western Corridor of Malaysia.  Every major Malaysian port is 
located along the Straits of Malacca, and this is reflected in the Malaysian effort to 
promote two straits ports namely Port Klang and the port of Tanjung Pelepas as 
international trans-shipment hubs for container traffic.  Obviously the Straits of Malacca 
is strategically important to Malaysia.   
 
 The primary aim of Malaysia is to ensure that it has complete control over the 
Straits of Malacca.  Malaysia feels there is no need for the presence of an extra regional 
force for the purpose of securing the Straits and that such presence would impinge on the 
sovereignty of the country.  Malaysia disagrees with the suggestions that the US might 
station special forces in the vicinity of the Straits of Malacca to carry out counter-
terrorism operations and piracy due to sovereignty issues as well as domestic political 
sensitivities.  But this prospect resulted that the littoral states would cooperate more 
closely in carrying out coordinated year round patrols to ensure the security of the sea 
lane.  Malaysia was against foreign military forces patrolling the Straits of Malacca.  
However Malaysia welcomes foreign monetary and technical aid to tighten the security in 
the vital Straits.
99
  Despite lingering mutual suspicions, Malaysia with other littoral states 
has in effect been forced to cooperate closely due to the US intention to establish its naval 
presence in the vital Straits.   
 
 Regarding the piracy threat in the Straits of Malacca, Malaysia has tackled the 
issue more aggressively.  It has developed its naval capacity to ensure maritime security 
in its territorial water.  For instance, Malaysia has its own version of the US Coast Guard 
to patrol and safeguard security along the Straits of Malacca.  The Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency (MMEA) as one of the important Malaysian agencies in fighting 
piracy has increased its patrol against piracy and the risk of maritime terrorism in the 
Straits of Malacca.
100
  It equips with vessels and aircraft capable of operation around the 
clock.  Moreover, the “Eyes in the Sky” (EiS) which was proposed by Malaysia is one of 
the significant steps to enhance cooperation in the Straits of Malacca among the littoral 
states.  The initiative focuses on the conducting of maritime air patrols in the Straits of 
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Malacca by the three littoral states.
101
  It also allows the littoral states to contribute their 
capabilities to the security in the Straits.  The littoral states, however, recognise that they 
do not have adequate assets to implement these initiatives, thus, the involvement of user 
states in providing assets that can only be manned by personnel from the littorals, was 
adopted.     
 
The Littoral State of Indonesia 
 
Meanwhile, Indonesia is another littoral state that is concerns over the security of the 
Straits of Malacca.  On the Indonesian side, the Straits of Malacca is of great importance 
for similar socio-economic reasons like Malaysia.  As an archipelagic country made up 
over 13,000 islands scattered across a range of over 5,000 kilometres from east to west, 
Indonesia's maritime security concerns are far broader than piracy in the Straits of 
Malacca.
102
  Combined with the fact that major victims of piracy in the Straits of Malacca 
are merely passing through the Straits with little economic benefits to Indonesia, the 
country's interest in anti-piracy efforts in the Straits of Malacca is limited.  Among the 
littoral states, Indonesia has the longest coastline along the Malacca Straits, and most 
pirates are believed to come from that country due to its political instability and poor 
economic performance.  Furthermore, Indonesia also has limited capability particularly in 
providing equipments to fight the piracy threat. 
 
 However, Indonesia has been, in recent years cracking down on piracy along its 
coasts.  In particular, it has extended it police operations on land to deter and arrest 
pirates.  Some significant constraints remain.  The Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) is poorly 
equipped to address piracy.
103
  The Indonesian air force also suffers from a lack of 
funding, which further undermines Indonesia's capability to ensure its maritime security.  
The navy and the police in general need more manpower, funds, sophisticated technology 
and weaponry to fight piracy effectively.  Indonesia is keen to receive external assistance 
in the form of equipment and training, but wants this assistance for its own priorities.   
 
The Littoral State of Singapore 
 
Singapore's location in the heart of the Straits of Malacca and its economy's critical 
dependence on trade, demand its attention on piracy in the Straits of Malacca.  Combined 
with long-standing mistrust of predominantly Muslim Malaysia and Indonesia, 
Singapore's high priority on the Straits security has led it to seek closer cooperation with 
external partners, especially the US and Japan, sometimes beyond the comfort level of 
Singapore's neighbours.  Singapore's strong support for the US war against terrorism has 
been rewarded with much closer strategic, security and economic relations.  The country 
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is the 11th largest trading partner of the US with two way trades worth over US$26.3 
billion in 2007.
104
       
 
 Singapore has traditionally been concerned with its economic prosperity, which is 
dependent on international trade.  Singapore is a major trans-shipment hub and sits astride 
the east-west main route within the global hub of container network.  It has the second 
largest container port in the world.  Hence, the city-state is eager to see the safety of 
navigation ensured in the Straits of Malacca.  The Singapore Coast Guard (SCG), which 
has gone through an upgrading program since the early 1990s, is directly involved in 
preventing piracy acts in its territorial waters.
105
  In addition, the city-state has since 9/11, 
increased air and navy patrols in its air space and territorial waters.  Singapore already 
possessed the most capable naval and maritime security forces in Southeast Asia and does 
not require as much external assistance in terms of equipment and training except for 
joints operations.  Singapore further encourages the physical presence of external naval or 
maritime forces in the vital Straits. The third littoral states, Singapore in contrast to 
Indonesia and Malaysia desperately wants a greater US presence in the Straits.  It sees the 
value of a US presence not merely in commercial terms but also as a military 
counterweight to maintain stability and peace in the Asia Pacific region.
106
  Singapore has 
emerged as a principle security ally of the US in Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold 
War, particularly following the departure of the US from Subic Bay Naval Base in the 
Philippines in 1992.  It actively searches for ways to keep the US engaged in the region. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has examined the littoral states' position towards piracy and their interests in 
the Straits of Malacca as well as the position on external power involvement.  Overall, the 
strategic importance of the Straits of Malacca continues to grow.  Today, the Straits of 
Malacca retains its eminence as a commercial sea lane and strategic waterway. As 
globalisation takes hold of the world, the Straits of Malacca finds itself still very much a 
key artery of global commerce, serving over one third of seaborne trade.  In a way, one 
might say that the Straits of Malacca has contributed substantially to the development of 
nations which are heavily reliant on inter-continental trade.  Not only the littoral states but 
also the major user states are concern on the safety of navigation particularly China, 
Japan and India.  Their expression of interest in the security of the Straits of Malacca is a 
reflection of their efforts to preserve their own individual strategic interests.   
                                                 
 
104
 US trade with Singapore, 2007, http://singapore.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/ (29 February 
2008) 
 
105
 R. Emmers, Comprehensive security and resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN's approach to 
terrorism and sea piracy, p. 12. 
 
106
 J.N. Mak, Unilateralism and regionalism, in, G.G. Ong-Web (ed.), Piracy, maritime terrorism 
and securing the Malacca Straits, p. 157. 
